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14. ABSTRACT The 21 <sup>st</sup> Century U.S. security environment requires a JFC to be prepared to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. This paper recommends that a JFC use measures of effectiveness (MOE) to determine if his conventional military forces in a counterinsurgency environment are attaining the desired results. Research identified several recurring areas where operational level conventional military force can be used in a counterinsurgency. Three of these areas were selected for discussions; isolation of the insurgency, seizing and maintaining the initiative, and establishing and maintaining security. The discussed areas provided context and were then used to develop and recommend baseline MOE. The vast scope of counterinsurgencies and the numerous permutations of employment options for conventional military force at the operational level preclude a comprehensive listing. Additional, mission specific measures can be developed by using the sample framework or developing a similar one. The information provided by the MOE tool can help the JFC integrate the full-spectrum of military force actions and, when combined with the other elements of power at the three levels of war, lead to the development and execution of a comprehensive and complementary counterinsurgency campaign plan.					
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**BENEFICIAL OR BUZZWORD: CAN OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS USE  
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS DURING COUNTER-INSURGENCIES?**

**By**

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**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily  
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

17 May 2004

## **Abstract**

The 21<sup>st</sup> Century U.S. security environment requires a JFC to be prepared to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. This paper recommends that a JFC use measures of effectiveness (MOE) to determine if his conventional military forces in a counterinsurgency environment are attaining the desired results. Research identified several recurring areas where operational level conventional military force can be used in a counterinsurgency. Three of these areas were selected for discussions; isolation of the insurgency, seizing and maintaining the initiative, and establishing and maintaining security. The discussed areas provided context and were then used to develop and recommend baseline MOE. The vast scope of counterinsurgencies and the numerous permutations of employment options for conventional military force at the operational level preclude a comprehensive listing. Additional, mission specific measures can be developed by using the sample framework or developing a similar one. The information provided by the MOE tool can help the JFC integrate the full-spectrum of military force actions and, when combined with the other elements of power at the three levels of war, lead to the development and execution of a comprehensive and complementary counterinsurgency campaign plan.

## **Table of Contents**

Introduction	1
Operational Level Military Use	3
Recommended Operational Level MOE	11
Conclusion	15
End Notes	17-18
Bibliography	19-20

## **List of Illustrations**

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Page</b>
1.	Range of Military Operations	3
2.	Types of Stability Operations	3
3.	System-of-systems Analysis	11

## INTRODUCTION

“...war is a struggle of wills. You look at the Arab press; they say, ‘We drove the Americans out of Beirut, we drove them out of Somalia; you know, we’ll drive them out of Baghdad.’ And that’s just not true. They’re not driving us out of anywhere.”<sup>i</sup>

General Abizaid, Commander, US CENTCOM

This comment by Gen Abizaid in July 2003 marked the first time that the Operation Iraqi Freedom Phase IV Stability and Support Operations were referred to as a war and it occurred three months after major operations had been declared to be over! That this different type of war did begin is a military fact. It also raises many pertinent questions. How well suited are U.S. operational level commanders to operate in this counterinsurgency environment? How can conventional military force be used at the operational level and how can the commander assess its’ effectiveness?

The current U.S. security environment combined with America’s global interests and commitments increase the likelihood that U.S. geographic combatant commanders or their subordinate operational level commanders (referred to in this paper as) Joint Force Commanders (JFC) will face insurgencies in their areas of responsibility. America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority status and the decisive full-spectrum capabilities and prowess demonstrated while removing the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq should deter most potential adversaries from head to head or strength against strength confrontation. Given that reality, it should be anticipated that potential adversaries will adopt the asymmetric method used successfully by weaker opponents to outlast their seemingly stronger adversaries, which is insurgent operations. Of the many factors that serve to increase the probability of facing future insurgencies two stand out. The first is the relative success, real or perceived within the Islamic world, of those who are resisting U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other is the increased specter of failed or

failing states coupled with the proclivity with which the U.S. assumes nation-building, peace operations, and/or global police type operations in which fighting an insurgency may be critical.

In a recent New York Times article about Iraq, Naval War College Professor John Waghelstein defined the multiple facets of a “total war” of fighting counterinsurgencies,

“Total war means you use all the elements of national power. It’s at the grass-roots level that you’re trying to win. You can kill enemy soldiers – that’s not the only issue. You also need to dry up their support. You can’t just use the military. It’s got to be a constant din of propaganda; it’s got to be economic support; it’s got to be elections. As long as you only go after the guy with the weapon, you’re missing the most important part.”<sup>ii</sup>

The vast breadth of the subject precludes a comprehensive review of all operational level measures of effectiveness (MOE) applicable to counterinsurgencies. Therefore, to scope this paper, and to illustrate the MOE development process it is concentrated on one area.

Specifically, the emphasis will be on the area where the JFC must use conventional military force to deal with insurgents because the threat of force has proven ineffective and resulted in the counterinsurgency crossing the threshold between noncombat and combat operations.

MOE regarding the operational level use of conventional military force can and should be used by JFC’s in counterinsurgencies. Research on past counterinsurgencies, successful and unsuccessful, indicated several recurring areas where a JFC can use his conventional military forces to achieve operational level results i.e., isolation of the insurgency, seizing and maintaining the initiative, and establishing and maintaining security. This paper discusses these areas and also recommends applicable operational level MOE to assist JFC’s engaged in counterinsurgencies in deriving, “a baseline of indicators of how well the military effort is achieving its specific, possibly limited goals.”<sup>iii</sup> The result should be a starting point for counterinsurgency related MOE to be added to a JFC’s array of tools to make sure

conventional military force used at the operational level properly complements the effects of the other elements of power.

## OPERATIONAL LEVEL MILITARY USES

To provide additional context a short review of current counterinsurgency considerations is helpful. Given that the threat of insurgencies is on the rise, three factors have combined to make fighting a counterinsurgency and using operational level MOE, difficult, especially for a JFC. The first is at the operational level, the U.S. National Military Strategy places a premium on the swift defeat of adversaries in overlapping campaigns and decisively winning campaigns to achieve more enduring results.<sup>iv</sup> Second, Joint Service doctrine has imbedded counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare, arguably the most difficult of military missions, within the larger context of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or within the evolving Stability Operations doctrine (see fig's 1. and 2.).

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
Military Operations		General US Goal	Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockades
	NONCOMBAT	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement / Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) / Strikes / Raids / Show of Force / Counterterrorism / Peacekeeping / Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief / Peacebuilding / Nation Assistance / Domestic Support / Counterdrug / NEO

Figure 1. Range of Military Operations<sup>v</sup>

TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS	OFFENSE	DEFENSE	STABILITY	SUPPORT
TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THEIR SUBORDINATE FORMS	<b>Peace Operations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peacekeeping</li> <li>• Peace Enforcement</li> <li>• Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts</li> </ul> <b>Foreign Internal Defense</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indirect Support</li> <li>• Direct Support</li> <li>• Combat Operations</li> </ul> <b>Security Assistance</b> <b>Humanitarian and Civic Assistance</b> <b>Support to Insurgencies</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unconventional Warfare</li> <li>• Conventional Combat Actions</li> </ul> <b>Support to Counterdrug Operations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detection and Monitoring</li> <li>• Host-Nation Support</li> <li>• C4</li> <li>• Intelligence, Planning, CSS, Training, and Manpower Support</li> <li>• Reconnaissance</li> </ul>		<b>Combatting Terrorism</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Antiterrorism</li> <li>• Counterterrorism</li> </ul> <b>Noncombatant Evacuation Operations</b> <b>Arms Control</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspection</li> <li>• Protection</li> <li>• Destruction</li> </ul> <b>Show of Force</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased Force Visibility</li> <li>• Exercises and Demonstrations</li> </ul>	

Figure 2. Types of Stability Operations<sup>vi</sup>

Third, the concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO) has not yet fully matured and at present has concentrated more on conventional military operations than counterinsurgencies. The impact of these factors and the likelihood of them coalescing in the same time and place



is potentially disastrous for a JFC. The long-duration nature of counterinsurgencies runs directly counter to the defense strategy which is the basis for force structure and capabilities generation. The lack of specific counterinsurgency doctrine, or its' blending with MOOTW or Stability Operations, and the relative immature EBO concept places undo stress on the JFC's ability to use operational art and intuitive decision making.

Three tenets of conventional wisdoms regarding insurgencies were also used to provide context for this study. The first is that no two insurgencies are alike. A common sense method of mitigating this is the development of baseline operational level MOE to gauge progress toward mission accomplishment as opposed to the current ad hoc or extemporaneous method and forms the reason for this paper. The second is that insurgencies are generally conducted in three phases (also referred to by some as stages), but there are elements consistent at each level. Mao's and Giap's insurgent strategies generally form the basis for this and have identified the phases of: defense, equilibrium, and offense. This strategy describes the gradual building from low level guerilla struggle, to a point in which their rising strength is comparable to their opposition, and on to the level where they can conduct mobile or conventional war to defeat their opposition. It is also noted that due to the long duration of an insurgency the phases may overlap and/or shift forward or backward in a possibly subtle and nondescript manner. The third conventional wisdom is that every insurgency requires a cause. Be it anti-colonialist, pro-communist, religion based, anti-Western, or a combination of these or others, insurgencies must have a causal basis to give them legitimacy (at least with their target audience) before they can tack on other issues such as regional autonomy for ethnic minorities or reduction in U.S. presence in a specific country or region.<sup>vii</sup>

A general overview of counterinsurgency conventional wisdom is required to provide the context that was used to identify the conventional military force actions at the operational level and the subsequent determination of appropriate MOE to assess those actions. The first is an operational conception of the “total war”, the counterinsurgency strategy mentioned earlier which all elements of governmental power must be thought of as multiple lines of operation (economic, informational, legal, psychological, military),<sup>viii</sup> and where success is gained through combining them in a complementary fashion to achieve a single strategic goal. The second is that political objectives and considerations outweigh military considerations. Brigadier General Gavin Bulloch (U.K., Ret), a former Director General of Development and Doctrine, UK Ministry of Defense, and author of the British Army publication *Counter Insurgency Operations* highlights this primacy of the political line of operation and urges that, “undue emphasis on military action clouds the key political realities, which can result in a military-dominated campaign plan that misses the real focus of an insurgency.”<sup>ix</sup> And the third conventional wisdom is that there has never been a quick, decisive successful counterinsurgency and therefore patience and long-term buy-in is an important component by a government, people, and/or army engaged in a counterinsurgency.

**ISOLATION:** The successful operational level isolation of insurgents by conventional military force is based on the accuracy of the intelligence relating to the insurgents. A JFC uses all assets to build a reliable “picture” of the enemy, gathered in part by his unconventional or Special Operations Forces as a precursor to conventional military actions and as such is beyond the scope of this paper. A caveat to the use of conventional military force in counterinsurgency operations that must be understood by the JFC is that its’ improper use can be counterproductive and drive greater numbers of the civilian population,

generally accepted as the insurgency's strategic center of gravity, to join, support, or tolerate the insurgents, as was the case in the Vietnam War. For representative purposes, this section discusses requirements to achieve external isolation at the operational level. History shows the operational level's need to use conventional military force to isolate insurgents from their supplies and bases of support. Their support can come from external or internal sources or more likely from a combination of both. To illustrate the critical need for external isolation, during one day in December 1970 despite daily air interdiction missions of that line of communication (LOC), an estimated 15,000 supply vehicles were on the famed Ho Chi Mihn Trail, allowing North Vietnam to logistically sustain the insurgency in South Vietnam via external support.<sup>x</sup> Another example of an operational level failure of U.S. commanders to isolate South Vietnam from external support is that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army forces suffered an estimated 330,000 casualties from 1965-67 but their overall strength in the South grew by an estimated 180,000 with the majority coming via infiltration vice local recruitment.<sup>xi</sup> Successful counterinsurgencies in Malaya (by the British) and the Philippines (by the U.S) were aided by their ability to isolate the insurgents from their sources of external support. Skillful use of conventional military force combined with the restrictive nature of those country's operational space factors (a peninsula and an archipelago respectively) enabled the commanders to then focus conventional military forces on internal isolation goals. Fundamental to the achievement of operational level external isolation is the requirement for the JFC to evaluate the multiple elements that comprise the operational space factor of the border areas with possible ingress and egress routes by all modes of transportation having priority of effort. The location of enemy forces or support on both sides of the border must also be determined to allow a JFCs' conventional forces to conduct

operational maneuver and gain positional advantage over the insurgents. This operational isolation is done with the objective of keeping the insurgents from being reinforced or resupplied from outside sources, dispersed and/or unable to mass.

**SEIZE INITIATIVE:** In his book Defeating Communist Insurgencies, Sir Robert Thompson postulates that, “It is the secret of guerilla forces that, to be successful, they must hold the initiative...”<sup>xii</sup> Insurgents seek the ability to choose the time and place of their attacks. They use their relative tactical mobility advantage to evade counterattacks to create the perception that they have beaten the regular forces or they have at least held their own. Based on the general population’s view, these events can create operational and/or strategic success for the insurgents. This phenomenon has come to be popularly described as, winning every battle but losing the war. A JFC can use conventional military force to create unfavorable situations for the insurgents that result in their reacting to actions of the friendly forces and losing their inherent ability to drive the operational tempo. The common description and use of operational tempo remains constant for counterinsurgencies in that tempo should not be judged on the pace but on the, “speed of action and reaction relative to the insurgent.”<sup>xiii</sup> An historical example of this is the “clear and hold” concept used effectively by the British fighting an insurgency in Malaya. Conventional military force would be used to “clear” an area of insurgents or their influence through offensive action and then to deny their return through retention of the area, hence use of the term “hold” (a subset of the operational level Security issue). Thompson recommends taking additional operational level offensive actions in conjunction with “clear and hold” type-operations to then, “penetrate insurgent-controlled areas in order to keep the insurgent units off balance and if possible dispersed.”<sup>xiv</sup> The tandem “squeezing” effect of these operations decreases

the insurgents operating areas making them more susceptible to attack and forces them to adopt a defensive mindset.

**SECURITY:** Thompson also warns that during an insurgency's initial phase the government (or occupying force in the case of Iraq), "must secure its' base areas first."<sup>xv</sup> The JFC's overarching operational net assessment along with time, space, and force factor assessments and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) will determine the specific goals for the conventional military force security plan. However, prioritizing the myriad people, places, things, areas, and routes requiring security remains the teachable point. The Marine Corps learned this lesson during their frequent involvement in this country's "Banana Wars" in Central America during the 1920's and 1930's and codified it in their "Small Wars Manual" originally published in 1940. This manual recommends that conventional military force should be prioritized and that the "initial problem is to restore peace in concert with other factors"<sup>xvi</sup> thereby gaining a foothold on establishing operational security. However, a balance must be struck regarding conventional offensive and defensive uses of military force where as pointed out by Brig. Bulloch (U.K., Ret) in a Parameters article that, "At times there may be opportunities for flair and for instigating decisive action against insurgent groups, but on most occasions troops will be confined to acting in a stabilizing, holding role..."<sup>xvii</sup> It is here that use of police, paramilitary forces, and/or host-nation forces becomes important in assuming some of the significant manpower intensive point defenses, thus freeing the more mobile and lethal conventional military forces to conduct the paramount offensive missions. As with any conventional operational defensive a certain amount of local (tactical level) offensive action is required to increase the overall operational level security as well as complementing isolation and initiative seizing objectives. An offense oriented, yet

appropriately tempered, mindset is crucial to all uses of conventional military force to achieve the operational level security objectives. To highlight the manpower intensive nature of security, Ian Beckett in his book, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies points out that, “it took 20,000 Marines to defend the 800 square miles of the Da Nang air base adequately, and even this did not prevent continued communist activity in the vicinity.”<sup>xviii</sup> Two further examples of the complexity relating to security and reinforcing Sir Thompson’s warning that, “there are no short-cuts or gimmicks,”<sup>xix</sup> to defeating an insurgency are the Resettlement and Strategic Hamlet System programs used in Vietnam. In the first nine months of 1963 alone over 8,000 strategic hamlets were created with an estimated resettled population of over 8 million.<sup>xx</sup> However, lacking proper operational level (and tactical) security and using inappropriate MOE, the measurement criteria used was not sensitive to force performance among other areas, making accurate assessment impossible until 1970. Had U.S. commanders gotten more reliable feedback, program adjustments could have been implemented to secure the population and base areas and also would have complemented the isolation objectives.

**COUNTERARGUMENTS:** Two potential counterarguments to this paper’s thesis can be posed. The first is that a counterinsurgency by its’ very nature, like in many MOOTW operations the levels of war are blended, blurred, and or compressed to the point they are virtually one and the same. Therefore, if this is true no operational level military actions can be executed, resulting in no requirement for operational level MOE. A body of thought during the mid- to late 1990’s codified this set of circumstances into a concept named, “The Three Block War”. In accordance with this concept Marine Commandant General Charles Krulak painted a scenario where within three contiguous blocks in the same urban

neighborhood, and within the span of a few hours, the same small military unit could be engaged in humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or conventional combat. Due to these circumstances it was envisioned that young non-commissioned officers would be required to make crucially important decisions and was termed to be a “Strategic Corporal.” The name highlights that his tactical level decisions could have strategic level results or ramifications. The book and movie “Blackhawk Down” provides a real example, the Rangers’ tactical level action had the strategic result of President Clinton changing official Somalia policy and withdrawing U.S. forces a short while later.<sup>xxi</sup> Mitigation of this counterargument can be derived from Vietnam War lessons where an over preoccupation of tactical level effects (i.e., Body Counts) by U.S. strategic and operational leaders distracted them from measuring the things that would truly indicate success in that war and contributed to eventual insurgent victory.

The second potential counterargument is the still maturing framework, and unproven regarding counterinsurgencies, concept of EBO. Its’ relative “newness” proved to limit my research as there is not an available library of applicable data. What is available regarding the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) portion of the EBO concept indicates limited operational level usefulness in counterinsurgencies. The reason ONA’s is not directly applicable is due to the current conventional operations and tactical level focus because the currently fielded intelligence collection capabilities are primarily used to gather “hard data” used in combat assessments like Bomb Damage Assessments or the effects of shaping operations on enemy formations. The ability to actually harvest accurate MOE feedback to build an ONA at the operational level of a counterinsurgency is questionable at best. The

complexity of this daunting process (see fig. 3 on the next page) is graphically represented by the System-of-systems component of EBO




Figure 3. System-of-systems analysis<sup>xxii</sup>

and must be actualized to make this concept relevant.

Mitigation of this counterargument is offered in the book, The Art of Insurgency by Donald Hamilton when he warns that, “Insurgency War is ... best understood, not as a science to be quantified and mastered in some mechanical fashion, but rather as a strategic art to be revealed, studied, and integrated over time.”<sup>xxiii</sup> In other words, regardless of whether the ONA framework ever works, a JFC must have some method of gauging the conventional military force success (along with all other elements) at the operational level while fighting an insurgency and that MOE are a viable, if somewhat subjective tool.

## RECOMMENDED OPERATIONAL LEVEL MOE

The following recommendations address the current lack of tools a JFC can draw upon to help evaluate the operational level effects of his conventional military force in fighting a counterinsurgency. These MOE can be used, or more likely the logical construct used to derive them, to develop case specific MOE when engaged in future counterinsurgencies. The



three operational level uses of conventional military force discussions were used to generate the following MOE. A JFC using these and adding other ones tailored to his specific scenario can create realistic, universally understood, and accepted MOE to determine if he has it “right.” This challenging task requires frequent, impartial, and force performance sensitive evaluations that help prevent a JFC from becoming tied to the current plan thus limiting the ability to assess the situation and make required changes.<sup>xxiv</sup> Reinforcement of the importance of the operational intelligence function in a counterinsurgency and how it “drives” the assessment of conventional military actions is required before describing the MOE framework. A sustainable, persistent, and “fused” intelligence “picture” must be maintained throughout the campaign and is accomplished by the JFC’s full-spectrum Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan. Put simply, MOE without collection means are useless. The piecing together of tactical level evidence, (i.e., results of ambushes and small unit border engagements) may be a method determining operational level effectiveness but may fall “beneath the RADAR” of the JFC’s plan. Highlighting their potential importance through the various existing methods like Commander’s Intent or Commander’s Critical Information Requirements can facilitate tracking and input by subordinate units.

Several factors were used to generate the following MOE. The ability to serve as a bridge between the strategic and tactical levels was the criteria to determine an operational level nature. Also weighing on the operational nature was the consideration that they would be a component part of the JFC’s campaign or major operations. Conventional forces were determined by those ground, air, maritime forces that are generally grouped under the broad heading of combat arms. These forces will be the ones conducting combat operations against the insurgents. These factors together produce the conventional military force “line of

operation.” The specific action had to fall along that line of operation and be able to intersect with, support, or be supported by other the lines of operation. The MOE’s relationship with the all-important collection plan must be understood. The degree of understanding was based on where the action plotted on three separate but interrelated spectrums. The spectrums, or ranges, went from one extreme to the other in the areas of: tangible to intangible, objectively assessable to subjectively assessable, and quantitative to non-quantitative.

**ISOLATION MOE:** Recalling that conventional military action at the operational level used incorrectly could alienate the friendly forces from the general population and create a closer relationship between them and the insurgents demands that MOE be developed to detect and assess counterproductive results in a timely manner. For example, possible MOE for the current offensive operations in Iraq aimed at the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr could be: general population uprisings (an insurgent operational goal) in Karbala or other cities, excessive and increasing harassment of friendly forces, increased local support of insurgents, assessment of Arab media coverage, and lack of willingness on the part of U.S. trained Iraqi Security forces to engage the al-Sadr militia.

The following MOE could be used by a JFC and serve as recommendations to determine operational level external isolation of his assigned area of operations and are made in concert with the discussion paragraph above. In no particular order:

- Frequency and type of combat engagements along border regions and assessment of insurgent reactions (i.e., DRAW-D paradigm).
- Number of friendly forces engaged in combat missions along borders and whether the amount is steady state, increasing, or decreasing.
- Proportional decreases in internal insurgent activity in areas with on-going or recent combat operations.
- Indicators of a shift in phase of insurgency (tactics, weapons type and amount, size and type of enemy units, insurgent training levels, etc...)

- Insurgent activity levels along verified cross border lines of communications (LOCs), to include roads, off-road avenues of approach, waterways, harbors and ports, airports, and expeditionary airfields.
- Insurgent activity levels at suspected cross border LOCs.
- Activity at known or suspected marshalling areas in neighboring countries.
- Cause of increase in insurgent strength, infiltration or recruitment.
- Increased reliance by insurgents on their internal support systems.

**SEIZE INITIATIVE MOE:** Determination of which side has the initiative advantage is crucial for the JFC. Based on the corresponding Seize Initiative discussion earlier in this paper it is assumed that insurgents have an inherent initiative advantage and is part of the attraction to use the guerrilla tactics favored by insurgents, especially in the early phases of the insurgency. Evaluation of whether the JFC's efforts are having the desired operational level effects on the insurgency will hinge on the ability to disrupt insurgent operational activities and to expand the friendly force's freedom of maneuver. In general terms the goal is to increase or maintain friendly freedom of maneuver while denying or limiting the insurgent's freedom of maneuver. The following MOE, also in no particular order, should be considered in relation to the corresponding Seize Initiative discussion earlier in this paper:

- Increase in JFC's operational reach.
- Negation of insurgent interior lines of operation advantage (if they did have it).
- JFC's ability to achieve simultaneity with his operations.
- Corresponding insurgent dispersal of personnel or resources to friendly force operations.
- Decrease in insurgent initiated combat actions.
- Insurgent actions once engaged in combat.
- Characteristics of insurgent's form of warfare, increase or decrease of guerrilla war actions or increase or decrease of conventional warfare actions.
- Expansion or contraction of insurgent controlled areas.
- Ability to project forces where JFC desires, especially into insurgent controlled or dominated areas.
- Ability to engage with JFC mobile operational reserve.

**SECURITY MOE:** As highlighted in the Security discussion, the JFC must give priority to the creation of relatively secure bases from which to begin counterinsurgency operations.

The JFC combines the components of the operational logistics function to achieve the movement and maintenance of the force and must be considered in total to gain this secure base for further counterinsurgency operations. The operational level security is complementary to the operational force protection function but is not synonymous with force protection measures. The following MOE, also in no particular order, should be considered in conjunction with the earlier Security discussion paragraph:

- JFC accessibility to and use of MSR's, alternate LOC's, water sources, and fuel storage or distribution sites.
- Security evaluation of instituted population resettlement, village protection, or other systematic counterinsurgency programs along the same vein of the Vietnam Strategic Hamlet concept and its' corresponding Hamlet Evaluation System.
- Expansion of friendly operations into insurgent influenced territory.
- Expansion of friendly operations into insurgent controlled territory.
- Increase in "host-nation" police, military, or paramilitary forces numbers
- Increase in "host-nation" police, military, or paramilitary mission effectiveness.
- Level of public order and ability to restore public order.
- Detection of insurgent reconnaissance and surveillance and friendly counter-reconnaissance operations results.
- Deny insurgent ability to impede friendly support base operations.
- Insurgent activity, type and frequency, changing friendly force combat ratios to accomplish the same missions (i.e., forward operating bases now in danger of being destroyed vice harassed).
- Complement the seizing of initiative by creating offensive opportunities.

## **CONCLUSION(S)**

In summary, this paper identified the need for a JFC to determine the effectiveness of conventional military force used at the operational level during counterinsurgencies. It further recommends the identification and use of operational level measures of effectiveness as an available and beneficial tool to partially fulfill that JFC requirement. Operating in the multidimensional counterinsurgency environment, JFC's must tailor all actions to fit their insurgency's unique situation. Conventional military force is used by the JFC to achieve designated operational level objectives. Research identified several recurring areas where

conventional military force can effectively be used at the operational level of a counterinsurgency. The three selected for discussions were; isolation of the insurgency, seizing and maintaining the initiative, and establishing and maintaining security. Those areas were then formed the context for recommending baseline MOE. Drawing upon historical examples and doctrinal information, these uses were examined to create a requirement that would facilitate determination of appropriate operational level MOE. The vast scope of the subject and the numerous permutations of employment options for conventional military force at the operational level preclude a comprehensive listing of all MOE. The doctrinal publication, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations caveats its' discussion of MOE by stating, "MOE are only limited by the imagination of commanders and their staffs."<sup>xxv</sup> The recommended construct for developing operational level MOE and the representative MOE themselves help identify leverage points, key nodes, and linkages to other friendly "lines of operations". These should complement and combine with each other within their respective level of war, operational in this circumstance, and also with strategic and tactical level MOE. The goal is to generate cohesive and decisive effects on the insurgent's will, capabilities, and ability to sustain or expand the insurgency.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, U.S. global interests, obligations, and the requirements of the Global War on Terror, JFC's must be as prepared as possible to successfully operate in a counterinsurgency environment. An important element of this success is the ability to conduct accurate and timely assessment of friendly force actions. Use of the recommended MOE can be a potential start point for evaluating the effects achieved through conventional military force and following the sample framework (or developing a similar one) U.S. JFC's will have a beneficial tool. The information provided by that tool can help integrate the full-

spectrum military force uses and, when combined with the other elements of power at the three levels of war, lead to the development and execution of a comprehensive and complementary counterinsurgency campaign plan.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>i</sup> General John Abizaid, quoted in Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerilla War? (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 1.

<sup>ii</sup> John Waghelstein, Lkd, quoted in Peter Maas, “Professor Nagl’s War,” The New York Times, (11 January 2004),  
<<http://www.usma.edu/publicaffairs/directorscorner/NYTNaglJan04.htm>> [1 May 2004], 5.

<sup>iii</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: 12 February 1999), I-18.

<sup>iv</sup> Secretary of Defense, National Military Strategy 2004 (Draft) Briefing Slides, Seminar Presentation, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 15 March 2004, 18.

<sup>v</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), I-2.

<sup>vi</sup> Secretary of the Army, Stability Operations and Support Operations, FM 3-07 (Washington, DC: 20 February 2003), 1-4.

<sup>vii</sup> Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger 1966), 21.

<sup>viii</sup> Brigadier General Gavin Bulloch (U.K., Ret), “Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective,” Parameters, (Summer 1996): 5.

<sup>ix</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>x</sup> Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerillas and Their Opponents Since 1750 (London: Routledge 2001), 188.

<sup>xi</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>xii</sup> Thompson, 115.

<sup>xiii</sup> Bulloch, 9.

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<sup>xiv</sup> Thompson, 115.

<sup>xv</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>xvi</sup> United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, (Washington, DC: 1940), 1-9.

<sup>xvii</sup> Bulloch, 7.

<sup>xviii</sup> Beckett, 203.

<sup>xix</sup> Thompson, 171.

<sup>xx</sup> Beckett, 199.

<sup>xxi</sup> General Charles C. Krulak, Lkd, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," Marines Magazine, (January 1999),  
<<http://www.usmc.mil/cmcarticles.nsf/f9c9e7a1fe55fe42852564280078b406/>> [18 April 2004], 3.

<sup>xxii</sup> Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment, The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 4, (Norfolk, VA: 24 February 2004), 11.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Donald Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger 1998), 161.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Pub 3-07.6 (Washington, DC: 15 August 2001), 5-1.

<sup>xxv</sup> JP 3-07.3, I-18.

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